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ABSTRACT Because “evidence” is at issue in evidence-based medicine (EBM),
the critical responses to the movement have taken up themes from post-positivist phi-
losophy of science to demonstrate the untenability of the objectivist account of evi-
dence. While these post-positivist critiques seem largely correct, I propose that when
they focus their analyses on what counts as evidence, the critics miss important and
desirable pragmatic features of the evidence-based approach.This article redirects crit-
ical attention toward EBM’s rigid hierarchy of evidence as the culprit of its objection-
able epistemic practices. It reframes the EBM discourse in light of a distinction between
objectivist and pragmatic epistemology, which allows for a more nuanced analysis of
EBM than previously offered: one that is not either/or in its evaluation of the decision-
making technology as either iconoclastic or creedal.
AS THE NAME “evidence-based medicine” (EBM) should suggest, the conceptof “evidence” is central to the methodological innovation that the evi-
dence-based approach introduces to medicine. Recognizing this to be the case,
the critical responses to the movement have championed post-positivist motifs,
where the thinking of Quine, Kuhn, and Popper has been drawn upon to
demonstrate the flawed objectivist account of evidence underwriting EBM
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(Djulbegovic 2006; Harari 2001; Shahar 1997).1 (In discussing objectivity, I refer
to its contemporary formulation as the antithesis of subjectivity, the latter being
popularly understood to be a pejorative intrusion on scientific investigation. See
Daston and Galison 1992.) Objectivity is an epistemic virtue in science that
stands for an aperspectival “view from nowhere,” certainty, and freedom from
bias, values, interpretation, and prejudice. Even if objectivity cannot be achieved,
it is perceived to be an ideal worth striving for.
The anti-objectivist direction of EBM critique seems fitting. The proposed
practice of EBM calls for the evaluation and use of the best available evidence for
clinical use in patient care. EBM offers a definitive interpretation of what counts
as “best evidence” and encourages its cultivation and application by a hierarchy of
methods, clinical guidelines, and authoritative evidentiary sources.This results in
problems of knowledge translation, where EBM’s stratification of evidence is un-
likely to lead to better recommendations for therapy because of the considerable
gap between the characteristics of clinical trial populations and actual patient pop-
ulations seeking care (Bluhm 2005; Upshur 2005).Trial results show comparative
efficacy of treatment for an “average” randomized patient, and not for pertinent
subgroups formed by such cogent clinical features as severity of symptoms, illness,
and co-morbidity. The problem of generalizability calls EBM’s alleged objec-
tivism—namely, the objectivity of rigorous clinical evidence—into question.
There is also the overlapping yet distinct epistemological criticism that focuses
on the role of values and contingent social practices in belief formation and jus-
tification. The evidence-based approach remains noticeably silent on the values,
preferences, and other subjective content that inescapably enter into all decision-
making schemas. Its supporters unreflectively endorse the evidence-based valu-
ing of the quantitative at the expense of the qualitative, and the aggregate over
the personal. EBM’s configuration of evidence has been charged in various cri-
tiques with being objectivist, reductionist, positivist, and foundationalist (De
Simone 2006b; Goldenberg 2006; Holmes et al. 2006; Lambert, Gordon, and
Bogdan-Lovis 2006; Upshur 2002;Welsby 1999).The general conclusion com-
ing out of these critiques is that EBM’s “evidence base” is simply inadequate for
properly capturing the complex nuances of medical decision making in the clin-
ical context.
Objectivism. Reductionism. Positivism. Foundationalism. These distinct yet
overlapping isms are familiar tropes used in science studies for capturing features
of the flawed “textbook” account of the nature of science—a narrative of en-
lightened, truth-seeking, and value-free inquiry.This line of criticism has been
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taken up in EBM critiques to deny the presumed unmitigated gate-keeping abil-
ity of “the evidence” for delineating effective treatment from ineffective and
harmful alternatives (Goldenberg 2006).As DeVries and Lemmens (2006) argue,
“evidence” is a social product, influenced by the variable power and authority
held by different stakeholders (patients, medical researchers, hospital administra-
tors, clinicians, policy makers, etc.) in producing and determining the parame-
ters for what counts as evidence.The displacement of these normative consider-
ations in favor of technical and methodological considerations like the criteria
of best evidence or scientific rigor is regarded as ethically suspect (Goldenberg
2005).While evidence-based approaches are concerned with finding the best evi-
dence (according to their predefined standards) to answer research and treatment
questions, the critics ask the challenging question: whose evidence is setting the
standard of best practice (Harari 2001; Shahar 1997; Stewart 2001;Walsh 1996;
Witkin and Harrison 2001)?
What we see emerging in the critical investigations into evidence-based prac-
tice is not only a picture of an objectivist account of evidence underlying EBM,
but a broader objectivist worldview in which the evidence-based approach is
poised to operate. It has already been mentioned that the term objectivity carries
considerable epistemic weight in science and other knowledge-pursuing activi-
ties. It has been described allegorically as a “figure cast in stone, standing in our
cultural pantheon among symbols of divine knowledge” (Burnett 2008). Ob-
jectivity’s typical association with such equally powerful concepts as reality, truth,
and reliability further emphasizes its cognitive might.
Yet this objectivist ontology, where the evidence “speaks” and reliable knowl-
edge follows, presents an occupational hazard to (actual) medical practice.
Subjective content muddies up even the most rigorous evidence-based practice
by the inescapable layers of interpretation and sociocultural influence that enter
in the setting of research agendas (including what projects gets funded and why),
the production of evidence in primary research, and the selection of which evi-
dence is chosen to inform policy and practice. For instance, DeVries and Lem-
mens’s (2006) examination of the influence of pharmaceutical companies on the
conduct and reporting of clinical trials has demonstrated the nonevidentiary
forces shaping what is the basis of evidence-based medicine. Bogdan-Lovis and
Sousa (2006) have shown how the positive evidence in favor of midwife-led
births has not been implemented in American obstetrics units, thereby high-
lighting how ideology can impede evidentiary uptake. Looking at the health
policy-making process for daily hemodialysis therapy, Gordon (2006) demon-
strates how even what is required as evidence may be politically determined.
Conflicting value judgments about evidence and pressures exerted by stakehold-
ers render health policy making a political process, and EBM does not serve to
quiet special interests and agendas. Instead,Gordon characterizes EBM as a polit-
ical endeavor with vital ethical implications for clinical care.These examples lead
to the same conclusion about EBM’s so-called evidence base: against the appar-
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ent value-neutrality of letting the evidence “speak,” EBM can only to be true to
its principled “conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence
in making decisions about the care of individual patients” (Sackett et al. 1996, p.
71) if it takes these structural and sociocultural influences on the production and
application of evidence into account.
Pragmatism and EBM
While these post-positivist critiques seem largely correct to me, the focus on the
nature of evidence inaccurately depicts EBM as suffering from wholesale objec-
tivism. In fact, EBM demonstrates important pragmatist allegiances as well as the
objectivist tendencies already highlighted, but these features of the evidence-
based approach do not surface in the standard post-positivist critiques of how
EBM construes “evidence.” In addition to limiting our view of the scope of the
evidence-based approach, the critics miss the desirable pragmatic features of evi-
dence-based decision making. I propose to redirect critical attention toward
EBM’s fixed hierarchy of evidence as the guilty source of its questionable epis-
temic practices.This permits a more nuanced analysis of the various techniques
and epistemological commitments that comprise the evidence-based approach,
which, in turn, allows for consideration not only of EBM’s problematic areas, but
also of any advantageous attributes that ought to be maintained in revisions or
radical alternatives to the evidence-based program.
“Pragmatism” is an American movement in philosophy founded by Charles
Sanders Peirce and William James (ca. 1877, when Peirce published “The Fix-
ation of Belief ”) and marked by the doctrines that (1) the meaning of concepts
is to be sought in their practical bearings; (2) the function of thought is to guide
action; and (3) truth is preeminently to be tested by the practical consequences
of belief.The term pragmatic is used colloquially to mean a “matter of fact” or
“practical” approach to problem solving, and it is often placed in opposition to
principled approaches. In philosophy, it invites empirical investigation over ratio-
nalist inquiry and, following the important contributions by W.V. Quine, denies
the analytic-synthetic divide (Haack 2006; Menand 1997).
In his 1907 lecture “What Pragmatism Means,” James characterized pragma-
tism as standing for “the open air and possibilities of nature, as against dogma,
artificiality and the pretence of finality in truth” (p. 145). Pragmatists, he writes,
“turn towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action, and
towards power. That means the empiricist temper regnant, and the rationalist
temper sincerely given up.” Lastly, pragmatism “does not stand for any special re-
sults [or doctrines]. It is a method only” (pp. 144–45). While pragmatism has
evolved since James and has even diverged into feminist, analytic, and continen-
tal strains, it still retains this general commitment to ad hoc experiential inves-
tigative approaches and rejects the distinction between transcendental and
empirical truths.
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EBM: Pragmatic and Objectivist
Although pragmatism and objectivism might seem mutually exclusive, as the for-
mer emphasizes context and practice while the latter pursues universals, EBM
demonstrates affinity to both.The objectivist features of EBM have already been
discussed. The pragmatic tenor, interestingly, is captured in the evidence-based
allegiance to the randomized controlled trial (RCT). The evidence-based
method of choice is, in certain important respects, a pragmatic methodology:
RCTs temporarily suspend prior knowledge of human physiology, disease, and
pharmacology, all of which might allow for inferences regarding the effectiveness
of a particular drug in treating a given condition, and instead determine whether
a treatment works by trying the treatment in a large number of cases under con-
trolled conditions. Because RCTs are ostensibly unhindered by the pre-theoretic
expectations and commitments that can bias the deductive methods of basic sci-
ence and the less systematic experimental methods of clinical experience and
observational studies,RCTs seem to best promote the open inquiry and democ-
ratism of empirical science.Absent the influence of anticipated outcomes, scien-
tists faced with recalcitrant empirical data should be more open to revising even
well-established views about treatment efficacy.The reliability of the RCT as an
evidentiary source over, say, clinical experience or observational studies comes
from its careful controls.The controls imposed by RCTs give us, to use Quinean
terms, “firmer observational checkpoints and stronger inferences from observa-
tions to conclusions—particularly conclusions about interventions” (Sehon and
Stanley 2003).
The pragmatic commitments are readily apparent in EBM’s clear allegiance to
experimental methods of inquiry that set aside past habitual thinking in favor of
purely empirical investigation. Indeed, EBM’s promise of “the application of the
best research evidence to medical decision-making” (EBMWG 1992) could have
been achieved by strictly pragmatic scientific methodology. Critics like Benitez-
Bribiesca (1999) who charge EBM with being “nothing new”—biomedicine,
they contend, has always been evidence based—certainly think that this is all
there is to EBM.
Against this pragmatic spirit, however, is the famed hierarchy of evidence.The
hierarchy is a ranking of study designs based on their supposed methodological
rigor. EBM proponents hold that the trustworthiness or validity of evidence is a
function of the design of the study from which the evidence is obtained
(Canadian Medical Association 1994; Sackett 1997; Sackett et al. 1991), and so
the desire to use only the best evidence from clinical research in the manage-
ment of individual patients has resulted in elaborate classificatory schemes for
ranking the value of different types of studies (Sackett and Haynes 1995).The
numerous published formulations consistently place randomized controlled tri-
als (RCTs) or the systematic review of these trials at the top, with retrospective
studies well down the list; clinical anecdotes are seen as providing little if any evi-
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dence for the value of intervention (Canadian Medical Association 1994; Centre
for Evidence-Based Medicine 2006).
Unlike some other features of EBM, the hierarchy of evidence is notably non-
pragmatic, as pragmatism carries no pre-theoretical notions of evidence. Quine
insisted that no standards or methods are laid down prior to the business of con-
structing theories to explain and predict what we experience. Pragmatists hold
that there is “no simple formula for distinguishing viable theories or research pro-
grams from nonviable ones,” but rather an “inevitable need for extensive and mul-
tifaceted evaluation” (Nelson 1993, p. 184). RCTs, for instance, have proven their
worth for answering certain intervention questions, but, as I will argue, their
placement at the top of a preset hierarchy of evidence has yet to be justified.
The pragmatist tenets of method over doctrine, empiricism over rationalism,
and practical over principled approaches all speak to a “bottom-up” theory of
truth.2 This approach for ascertaining true beliefs inductively arose as an “anti-
theory” position, where pragmatists were greatly suspicious of grand normative
theories that begin with axioms and then proceed to deduce the theorems and
corollaries that guide normative practice.The worry was that deductive or “top-
down” procedure, where arguments move from abstract and general propositions
to conclusions about particular cases, can be too far removed from the intricate
workings of context and experience.Without constant and vigilant experiential
checks on even the most widely held beliefs, inaccurate theoretical commitments
could be dogmatically maintained.The recommended alternative is a bottom-up
approach, starting with judgments about particular cases and ending with low-
level principles that are concrete and contextual rather than abstract and general
(Coleman 2001). It now becomes apparent why pragmatists regarded experi-
mental inquiry so highly: problem solving is a leitmotif for pragmatism, and con-
crete problem solving and the advancement of knowledge is strongly held to be
best advanced through a reflexive process where our basic commitments can be
scrutinized and revised in light of new findings. It is for this reason that prag-
matism is “disdainful of abstract theory and intellectual pretension” and asks
instead what the consequences of particular decisions will be (Posner 2003).
EBM’s rigid and rule-based hierarchy of evidence stands in contrast to the
open-ended and ad hoc style of pragmatic scientific inquiry. The hierarchy’s
ranking has been explained by the EBM originators as being based on levels of
certainty (Sackett et al. 1991). It stands as EBM’s point of departure from prag-
matic science to a more objectivist epistemology, as the RCT’s gold standard sta-
tus will be shown to be problematically upheld by various abstract commitments
to the universal rigor and applicability of randomized trial methods that are not
substantiated in the actual practices of health research. Instead, different health
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research studies call for different designs and so there is no gold standard
methodology.
This pragmatist investigation into the hierarchy of evidence will consider,
first, the gold standard status of the RCT, then the legitimacy of its pride of place
at the top of the hierarchy, and, finally, the implications of this methodological
ranking for democracy and anti-authoritarianism in science.
Hierarchy and Gold
The RCT is both a component of the objectivist ontology to which EBM sub-
scribes and the pragmatist’s method of choice.To understand the RCT’s dual cit-
izenship, the distinction must be made between the RCT methodology and the
RCT’s placement at the top of the hierarchy of evidence.We have seen already
that the randomized trial method promotes unhindered, open-ended empirical
inquiry. The “gold standard” status, however, is unwarranted, and it introduces
theoretical commitments that are not consistent with pragmatic scientific
inquiry.
To be the “gold standard” is to be “a method, procedure or measurement that
is widely accepted as being the best available” (Bandolier Glossary of Terms).The
status of the RCT as the gold standard in medical research is a well-known tenet
of the evidence-based program.The Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group
claimed that:“Because the randomised trial, and especially the systematic review
of several randomised trials, is so much more likely to inform us and so much
less likely to mislead us, it has become the ‘gold standard’ for judging whether a
treatment does more good than harm” (Sackett et al. 1996, p. 72).Yet against this
widely accepted view, the critics warn us to watch out for “fool’s gold” (Rosner
2002). Nancy Cartwright (2007) asked “Are RCTs the Gold Standard?” and
responded with a vigorous “no.” Gold standard methods, she explained, are
“whatever methods will provide (a) the information you need, (b) reliably,
(c) from what you can do and from what you can know on that occasion” (p.
11). Because the RCT sometimes does this well, but underperforms in other
contexts, it has no claim to methodological gold (Glasziou et al. 2004; Grossman
and Mackenzie 2005).
What follows in this section is largely a rehearsal of the body of literature
challenging the RCT’s gold standard status in health research (Black 1996; Cart-
wright 2007; Grossman and Mackenzie 2005; Timmermans and Berg 2003).
From a pragmatist perspective, the problem is not so much that the gold stan-
dard status is tenuous, but that the RCT’s placement of at the top of the hierar-
chy is so insistently maintained. It is largely in the interest of avoiding dogmatic
theoretical commitments that pragmatists endorse a bottom-up approach to the-
ory construction, where localized beliefs must pass the test of experience in
order to be elevated to generalizable knowledge claims.There are numerous ex-
perimental scenarios in health research where the RCT would not be the
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methodology of choice,which suggests that the hierarchy of evidence would not
pass the rigors of the bottom-up approach to theory building. (It is arguable, of
course, that it should not meet the standards of the top-down, deductive ap-
proaches either.)
The claims that RCTs are the gold standard and therefore deserve placement
at the top of the hierarchy of evidence rest on the certainty that deductive meth-
ods permit in scientific investigation. However, the place of RCTs as the gold
standard in health research—where real-world RCTs rather than idealized ran-
domized experiments are conducted—is contestable.3 Purely deductive methods
like the ideal RCT are admirably rigorous: if the inputs (auxiliary assumptions)
are true, the methods are applied correctly, and the outcomes (evidence) are true
and have the right form, then the hypothesis must be true (Cartwright 2007).
But RCTs suffer, as do all deductive methods, from narrowness of scope.Their
results are formally valid for the group enrolled in the study, but only for that
group.The success of the deductive method rests on the auxiliary assumptions
being extremely restrictive, allowing only a very specialized type of evidence as
input, and having only special forms of conclusion as output.This is a familiar
trade-off between internal and external validity where we can ask for methods
that “clinch” their conclusions, even though the conclusions are likely to be very
limited in their range of application (Cartwright 2007).4
Once internal validity has been established, the next step in health research is
to export the causal claim validated through the RCT from the experimental
population to a target patient population. Here, Cartwright tells us, the rigor
gives out.Various methods are employed to try to take into account all possible
sources of difference between the test and target populations, yet all of them are
underwritten by our fallible judgments about possible sources of difference.As a
result, none of the conclusions reached meet the standard that advocates of the
exclusive use of RCTs hold on to. RCTs, as we know, provide averaged effects
of treatment, and treatment effects are always heterogeneous.They will, to use
Cartwright’s phraseology, at best vouch for the conclusion rather than clinch it. In
conclusion, the RCT “takes us only a very small part of the way we need to go
for practical knowledge” (p. 18).
Even with Cartwright’s warning about the vanity of rigor in RCTs, many
EBM critics will concede that RCTs are effective for gathering even broadly
applicable practical knowledge about some interventions, but fail in other con-
texts. For example,RCTs are widely regarded as offering good experimental de-
sign for large drug trials. Randomization is thought to effectively guard against
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bias in the allocation of subjects to the experimental and control arms, and the
various controls assist in firmly establishing the causal relationship between the
active chemical agent and the targeted measurable outcomes. However, even
without calling those claims into question—as has been done by Howson and
Urbach (1993),Worrall (2002), and Borgerson (this issue)—such techniques as
randomization and blinding are not always appropriate. Randomization, for
instance, is a futile exercise when the sample size is small compared to the num-
ber of variables. Even RCT and EBM advocates recognize that randomization
and blinding are not always possible, due to the nature of the investigation or for
ethical reasons. For instance, it would be impossible to randomize or blind par-
ticipants to assess the negative effects of smoking.And when comparing a surgi-
cal versus a nonsurgical intervention, it may be unethical to subject participants
in the non-surgical group to sham surgeries in order to maintain blinding
(Stirrat 2004). Grossman and Mackenzie (2005) have pointed out that even
when the limited applicability of RCTs is conceded by its advocates, one will
inevitably find an accompanying note stating that the alternative observational
or historically controlled trials that must be done instead are suboptimal in com-
parison to an RCT and therefore must be carried out only if there is absolutely
no way to do an RCT.This inability to perform an RCT is lamented because
the methodology is presumed to be the gold standard.Yet, the authors ask, how
can a design with limited applicability still be held as the gold standard in all
treatment scenarios? If an experimental design is impossible or unethical, it pre-
sumably is not the best method.Thus the sense of regret at not being able to exe-
cute an RCT may be unfounded.
It is surely more convincing for the argument that RCTs are not the gold
standard sub specie aeternitatis to consider scenarios where RCTs are both possi-
ble and ethical, but are inferior to other study designs. For example, in areas where
treatment advances are occurring rapidly, the use of observational databases is a
preferable option to avoid the results being out of date by the time the study is
complete (Grossman and Mackenzie 2005).HIV research provides numerous in-
stances where this time frame problem is encountered (Millson and Rachlis
1999; Sabin and Phillips 2001). Bakheit (2004) outlines the specific case of ex-
amining the effectiveness of botulinum toxin treatment on post-stroke muscle
spasticity, where RCTs are less suitable due to their inferior ability to address the
impact of the intervention on functional abilities and social participation.
Grossman and Mackenzie (2005) also challenge the belief held by many EBM
advocates that public health interventions should be evaluated in the same way
as pharmacological interventions (Sackett 1994). RCTs are a suboptimal study
design in social contexts due to the problem of bleeding of effects (which hin-
ders effective comparison) between the intervention group and the control
group.This problem arises frequently in trials using “free-living” human subject
populations. For example, subjects in blinded drug trials sometimes share their
drugs with friends who are also participating in the study, in the hope that every-
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one can benefit from the promising new, albeit unconfirmed, therapeutic agent.
Such activities are disastrous to the RCT. Often the best solution in such cases
is to analyze the study’s results according to the drugs actually taken by each sub-
ject, rather than by the drug delivered to each subject.This is easiest to organize
if the study is deliberately not blinded, because in a blind study the subjects have
an extra incentive to lie about their actions (for fear of being reprimanded for
breaking the blinding). Another way to avoid this effect would be to use a his-
torical, nonrandomized control group.
The best methodology will depend on the details of the social interaction of
the subjects with the researchers, and the necessity of taking these interactions
into account argues against the automatic privileging of a particular simple re-
search methodology such as the RCT (Grossman and Mackenzie 2005). This
scenario should prompt us to amend the previous statement that RCTs are
widely recognized to be the best experimental design for drug trials. Instead,
they may be the best design for large phase III pharmaceutical trials in compli-
ant populations. Different studies call for different design (Black 1996; Britton et
al. 1998).
And where does the hierarchy of evidence fit in? The evidence-based hierar-
chy only reinforces the RCT’s privileged status.The hierarchy applies to all eval-
uations of the medical trial literature, and so the RCT is presumably always bet-
ter than the alternatives.There have been numerous challenges to the legitimacy
of the evidentiary hierarchy (Concato, Shah, and Horwitz 2000; Grossman and
Mackenzie 2005; Rosner 2000, 2002;Vandenbrouke 1998, 2004). Petticrew and
Roberts (2003) maintain that “in certain circumstances the hierarchy may even
be inverted, placing for example qualitative research methods on the top rung”
(p. 528). Grossman and Mackenzie (2005) reject any hierarchy entirely, while
Bluhm (2005) exchanges the hierarchy for a network of evidence that takes into
account the relationship between epidemiological and laboratory research.
Hierarchy and Authority
In addition to taking us away from pragmatic scientific practices, the hierarchy
of evidence distances EBM from the pragmatist emphasis on democracy in sci-
ence. Classical and feminist pragmatism’s political stake in “getting to label who
knows, how she goes about knowing, and what she should and does know”
(Seigfried 1993, p. 1) clashes with the supposed universality of the hierarchy.The
hierarchy of evidence is the point at which evidence-based methodology can be
charged with authoritarianism.Amidst the broad EBM discourse, there has been
a small politicized debate regarding whether EBM represents a democratizing or
repressive force in biomedicine. EBM certainly proposed to be iconoclastic in its
early programmatic literature, and it invoked pragmatic methods meant to rid
medicine of its unwarranted habits of thought and practice (see for example
EBMWG 1992).
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EBM’s inaugural manifesto in JAMA captured the movement’s anti-authori-
tarian spirit.The Evidence Based Medicine Working Group (1992) stated: “the
new paradigm puts a much lower value on authority. The underlying belief is
that physicians can gain the skills to make independent assessment of evidence
and thus evaluate the credibility of opinions being offered by experts” (p. 2421).
In his recollections of his medical training in clinical epidemiology at McMaster
University by many of the faculty members who later initiated the Evidence
Based Medicine Working Group, Ross Upshur (2005) remembers being at-
tracted to its critical rationality. During rounds, students and residents were chal-
lenged to explicitly justify their proposed diagnostic strategy or therapeutic reg-
imen with the pointed question,“What is your evidence?”The call for evidence
in this context “was a call for something more than preference or convention, a
call to an external standard that could be adjudicated and discussed” (p. 480).The
transparency and accountability of critical appraisal techniques and EBM’s pro-
cedural emphasis on enhancing the cognitive skills of clinicians suggested a cer-
tain democratic iconoclasm that greatly appealed to earnest new physicians like
Upshur. Jo Ann Rosenfeld (2004), for instance, recounts:
We would read it for ourselves and make our own judgments whether to get
prostate-specific antibodies as screening for prostate disease on all men or not.
Clinical Evidence went even further. It made no judgments. It assembled the
evidence in one spot so that the practicing doctors could judge and decide for
them. Practicing doctors were expected to be able to think and judge.You might
not do it for every case, but you could look up the evidence on women’s incon-
tinence today and screening for colon cancer tomorrow. (p. 154)
Despite EBM’s apparent populism, both Upshur and Rosenfeld associate cur-
rent applications of EBM with authoritarianism. Rosenfeld tracks EBM’s histor-
ical movement from populism in its early years to its authoritarian present. She
argues that “evidence-based medicine at first promised to be a popularistic
movement, bringing the fruits of research to all practicing physicians. Instead it
has created its own religion and dogma, further codifying daily practice” (Ros-
enfeld 2004, p. 153):
During the last 3 years, EBM has gone from a tool to a religious doctrine and
fixed dogma.There are its priests—men and women who are known for practic-
ing and preaching EBM and changing the books and literature.You have to have
one of these priests on every board and journal, or you are not up to date.Any-
one who speaks against these priests is blaspheming EBM, and obviously unsci-
entific or backward.There are thousands of acolytes, those who have heard the
word and will accept nothing else. (pp. 154–55)
As a result, she argues that “we have come full circle to faith-based medicine” (p.
153; see also De Simone 2006a), where we have replaced one form of author-
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ity—namely, the habits and opinions passed down from one generation of clini-
cians to the next—with another, EBM.
This charge of evidence-based dogmatism is legitimated in part by EBM pro-
ponents’ confidence in evidence-based methodology despite no empirical evi-
dence being available to demonstrate EBM’s superiority (Haynes 2002; Upshur
and Tracy 2007).5 In a 2004 special edition of the British Medical Journal dedi-
cated to philosophical issues surrounding EBM, one contributor surmised:
Few would disown the EBM hypothesis—providing evidence-based clinical
interventions will result in better outcomes for patients, on average, than provid-
ing non-evidence-based interventions.This remains hypothetical only because, as
a general proposition, it cannot be proved empirically. But anyone in medicine today
who does not believe it is in the wrong business. (Reilly 2004, p. 991, emphasis added)
Some critics have identified EBM’s shift from being iconoclastic to becoming a
creed in its penchant for guidelines and the resulting codification of daily clini-
cal practice (Berg 1997; Denny 1999; Timmermans 2005). Upshur and Tracy
(2007) have indicted the hierarchy of evidence as the offender. Interestingly, the
hierarchy of evidence promotes methodological transparency and encourages
reasoned argument by providing a highly rationalized method for evaluating
clinical research, yet the hierarchy itself has no empirical legitimacy. As Upshur
and Tracy have argued, the entire edifice of evidence hierarchies is not based on
systematic research or empirical data, but upon expert judgment or consensus.
They charge that “the structuring of evidence according to a hierarchy is by no
means natural, intuitive, or even logically justified. In other words, the warrant
or justification for viewing evidence on such a hierarchical structure rests on
what EBM proponents consider the lowest form of evidence: the beliefs of a
few” (p. 159). Upshur and Tracy propose that the initial creation of an evidence
hierarchy was intended to link the quality of evidence to the soundness of the
recommendations based on the evidence.This stance was grounded in an unsub-
stantiated epistemological position that favors certain study designs (RCTs and
meta-analyses) on the belief that these methods are less susceptible than obser-
vational designs to bias. The key is the ability of randomization to eliminate
selection bias and the unprovable claim that randomization balances all relevant
known and unknown factors in a probabilistic sense (Worrall 2002).The hierar-
chy attributes lower reliability to expert judgment, and specifically subordinates
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5The near impossibility of empirically demonstrating the superiority of EBM over any other mode
of medical care by the methods regarded as persuasive by EBM itself has been recognized from the
outset. EBM’s initial manifesto states: “The proof of the pudding of evidence-based medicine lies
in whether patients cared for in this fashion enjoy better health.This proof is no more achievable
for the new paradigm than it is for the old, for no long-term randomized trials of traditional and
evidence-based medicine are likely to be carried out” (EBMWG 1992).
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theory and pathophysiological reasoning to designs with randomization. The
reasoning behind the latter subordination is unclear, as pathophysiology often
provides more fundamental understanding of causation and is in no way scien-
tifically inferior. Thus, Upshur and Tracy conclude, the hierarchy has been ad-
vanced on the basis of expert opinion rather than reasoned argument—a move
unbefitting of evidence-based thought and practice.
EBM guidelines and clinical summaries invoke charges of authoritarianism
for codifying daily practice and creating a hierarchy of EBM expertise.Given the
demands of keeping up with the literature, the time associated with evaluating
the abundance of clinical research, and the importance of “getting it right,” it did
not take long for EBM to replace its earlier call for individual critical appraisal
of the evidence by practicing clinicians with a veritable industry of systematic
review and meta-analysis (available for a fee, typically through electronic data-
bases). While thought by many to be timely and useful, the availability of meta-
analyses and clinical summaries immediately derails EBM’s early anti-authoritar-
ian programmatic.The initial program of equipping all practicing physicians with
critical appraisal skills (and “a computer at every bedside”) was intended to
democratize medicine by discarding the hierarchical nature of expert opinion
and received wisdom. That very authoritarianism seems to be restored by the
creation of “expert” EBM sources that proliferate clinical guidelines,meta-analy-
ses, educational products, electronic decision support systems, and all things wor-
thy of the brand name “evidence-based medicine” to a captive and paying audi-
ence of clinicians who desire to be “evidence-based practitioners.”
The various EBM organizations, such as the Cochrane Collaboration, Best
Evidence, and the Task Force are further criticized for being secretive institu-
tions.This system is not terribly different from the prior methods of peer review
with respect to assuring credible professional literature, however the internaliz-
ing of medical expertise within the various evidence-based institutions dimin-
ishes the likeliness of receiving disinterested (external) reviews. Even if the cur-
rent system creates evidence that is no worse than before, EBM had proposed
that it could do better. Rosenfeld (2004) asks:
Who are these people? We know where they are located and sometimes their
names, but we must blindly believe in their methods.They come up with con-
clusions that are published and then the conclusions become codified.The
Cochrane conclusions and abstracts are published on the web, but only those
who pay can get the full written method and evidence. Few practicing doctors
will pay for access to the Cochrane database.Who knows how Problem-Ori-
ented Evidence that Matters (POEMs) decide their evidence? The practicing
doctor has little access to these articles. Even Clinical Evidence, that source that
believed the practicing doctor can make his or her own conclusions, has pub-
lished “Concise” conclusions.Are we too busy, too stupid, or too unreliable to
use EBM for ourselves? (p. 155)
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Rosenfeld’s chronicle suggests that like EBM’s hierarchy of evidence, there is
now a hierarchy of EBM. Specifically, “only a few sources are now considered
‘true’ or reliable EBM. Some organizations list 11–15 ‘proper’ and ‘acceptable’
sources of EBM. All else, including good research, books, and reviews, are not
evidenced-based, and may not be used” (p. 155).This EBM structure is indeed
commercially profitable, and it has generated concern about financial conflict of
interest and publication bias within the medical literature.The BMJ Publishing
Group, for instance, has a significant stake in the EBM market through its pro-
duction and sales of costly EBM textbooks and evidence databases.The conflict
of interest is suggested by the finding that a significantly greater number of EBM
studies have been published in the British Medical Journal as compared to the sim-
ilarly ranked New England Journal of Medicine, which has no commercial invest-
ment in EBM (Upshur et al. 2006). Elsewhere, Charlton and Miles (1998) were
less tactful in their description of EBM as “in bed with the BMJ” (p. 373).
Levels of Certainty
While it would be premature to suggest that there is a link between objectivist
epistemology and authoritarianism, the threat of global skepticism that motivates
the former can certainly minimize tolerance of fallibility and ad hoc and local
investigative practices—the very characteristics of science proper—among more
ideological proponents of science.The pragmatists were well aware of the con-
nection between fallibilism and anti-skepticism, both of which concepts charac-
terize important features of pragmatist thought.6 This sort of absolutist search for
certainty can explain the appeal and rapid uptake of EBM.We have seen how
the positivist account of evidence underlying EBM is criticized for failing to
properly recognize the fallibility of scientific evidence.The worry that all of our
representations could be wrong can motivate the search for epistemic certainty,
and trouble arises because this quest is undertaken using a method of inquiry
that is supposed (and even desired) to be irrevocably fallible. Critics argue that
this promise of medical certainty is unrealistic, and they suggest that evidence-
based decision making must be replaced with a more nuanced model of knowl-
edge translation that can grapple with contingency and the uncertain path of ap-
plication of knowledge in practice (Champagne, Lemieux-Charles, and McGuire
2004).
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6In “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,” Peirce (1868) reacted against modern academic
skepticism by insisting that contrary to Descartes’s influential methodology in the Meditations on
First Philosophy, doubt cannot be created for the purpose of conducting philosophical inquiry.
Doubt,much like belief, requires justification. It arises from confrontation with some specific recal-
citrant matter of fact, which unsettles our belief in some specific proposition. Inquiry is then the
rationally self-controlled process of attempting to return to a settled state of belief about the mat-
ter. (See also Dewey 1929, where he argues against the reification of concepts and theories.)
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The proposal that the quest for certainty drives science and scientific medi-
cine is a familiar thesis within critical science studies. Paul Feyerabend (1978) has
described science as being obsessed with its own mythology of objectivity and
universality, while in medicine, Katherine Montgomery (2006) has argued that
medicine mis-specifies itself as a science, with an image of science that is anti-
quated and that does justice to neither medicine nor science. Science has also
been described, again by Feyerabend among others, as a repressing ideology that
started as a liberating movement. EBM reinforces these images, to a certain
extent, with its objectivist account of scientific medicine and rigid hierarchy of
evidence. If the hierarchy of evidence was put in place to refute skepticism and
ensure certainty, it stands as an example of what Feyerabend abhorred: science
making claims to truth well beyond its actual capacity. Science, the critics insist,
cannot fulfill this epistemic quest for certainty. Science is at best—and is at its
best—when it is recognized to be democratic, ad hoc, and fallible.
However, the philosophical obsession with skepticism is not necessarily the
driver of EBM. The knowledge problems motivating the evidence-based ap-
proach are regarded by some to be much more local and modest, for instance,
trying to minimize the presence of small area variations and the desire for
increased reliability and access to the best confirmed interventions. Howard
Brody and colleagues’ distinction between “crude” versus “sophisticated” EBM
distinguishes between the different ways in which EBM has been understood
and employed by supportive practitioners (Brody, Miller, and Bogdan-Lovis
2005). It also manages to capture the ideological/truth-seeking versus practical
motivation for adopting an evidence-based approach to medicine. The more
“practical” users being described here are those clinicians who find in EBM no
more than a tool to assist in clinical decision making, a task fraught with diffi-
culties for the very reason that the context always carries elements of uncer-
tainty. It is inappropriate for both supporters and detractors to ascribe the appeal
of EBM to one mindset or sensibility among its clinical followers.
An Objection
These critiques regarding the properly recognized fallibility of science and the
authoritarianism of EBM do not discount the possibility that guidelines gener-
ally help reduce error and improve medical outcomes. One can reasonably con-
cede that the rise of authoritarianism in EBM is a departure from its origins and
represents a shift from iconoclasm to creed, but still insist that guidelines, proto-
cols, and checklists are valuable instruments for reducing medical errors. For
instance, better compliance with the accepted guideline for physicians to wash
their hands before seeing each and every patient would certainly reduce the
spread of infection and illness.The general conclusion coming out of the guide-
lines literature is that guidelines are effective and easily implemented in standard
cases where prognosis, symptomology, diagnosis, and treatment are well-defined.
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Once the cases are less run-of-the-mill, however, there are a variety of obstacles
to the implementation of guidelines (see, for example, Dahan et al. 2007).There
is disagreement, of course, whether those challenges are surmountable, or
whether algorithms, protocols, and guidelines completely fail in these difficult
scenarios.
In How DoctorsThink (2007), Jerome Groopman expressed the worry that pre-
set algorithms and practice guidelines “discourage physicians from thinking
independently and creatively. Instead of expanding a doctor’s thinking they con-
strain it” (p. 5).While the dissenter might be justified in not wanting doctors to
think about washing their hands and instead to just do it, the relaxing of physi-
cians’ critical thinking skills can seriously compromise medical care in other sit-
uations where symptoms are vague, multiple, or confusing, or when test results
are inexact. Like many EBM critics, Groopman criticizes “today’s rigid reliance
on evidence-based medicine” for having physicians “choose care passively, solely
by the numbers” (p. 6). Reflecting on his motivation for writing a book on how
doctors think, Groopman recalls:
Each morning as rounds began, I watched the students and residents eye their
algorithms and then invoke statistics from recent studies. I concluded that the
next generation of doctors was being conditioned to function like a well-pro-
grammed computer that operates within a strict binary framework.After several
weeks of unease about the students’ and residents’ reliance on algorithms and
evidence-based therapies alone, and the equally unsettling sense that I didn’t
know how to broaden their perspective and show them otherwise, I asked my-
self a simple question: How should a doctor think? (p. 6)
This appeal to Groopman’s position is not intended to be an argument by
authority—Groopman could, after all, have some sort of axe to grind against
EBM. But what should strike both EBM proponents and dissenters as pertinent
is that the EBM community was founded upon the same interest in promoting
critical thinking in medicine.The movement’s penchant for developing clinical
guidelines is not merely a philosophical contradiction, but, by its own account,
dangerous to medical practice. EBM was one response to the perceived need to
improve doctors’ reasoning skills as an important component of medical train-
ing, and EBM continues to promote critical thinking alongside its clinical guide-
lines, clinical summaries, and other time-saving devices for reading the medical
literature. For example, Jenicek’s A Physician’s Self-Paced Guide to Critical Thinking
(2006) strongly promotes critical thinking as integral to modern medicine.7
While one might strongly support EBM’s methodology, that endorsement need
not include overconfidence in EBM’s ability to somehow encompass the neces-
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7For a review of the debates over guidelines, critical thinking, and other related conceptual and
methodological issues in the medical literature, see Miles, Loughlin, and Polychronis (2007).
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sary critical thinking piece of medicine into their (presumably) well-researched
and well-thought-out guidelines.
Conclusion
EBM has been argued to maintain both pragmatic and objectivist epistemolog-
ical allegiances. It is pragmatic in its commitment to the comparative analyses
offered by RCTs rather than basic science’s interest in causal understandings of
treatment interactions.The hierarchy of evidence, however, delves into nonprag-
matic epistemology, as the pregraded ranking of research methods offers a priori
normative properties for ascertaining maximal objectivity. In the interest of bet-
ter science, I propose that EBM’s pragmatic features are worth keeping. By this,
I mean that the open-ended critical inquiry should be encouraged, as should
comparative clinical research and problem-specific methodology (which may
include uncontrolled methods and even reliance on clinical judgment).The rigid
hierarchy of evidence, as we have seen, leads to considerable problems for EBM
and should be dismantled.The EBM critics, writing from the post-positivist phi-
losophy of science tradition, have amply demonstrated these problems. But the
constructive project of revisioning or perhaps recasting the evidence-based ap-
proach to medicine requires that the worthwhile aspects of EBM not be dis-
carded along with its flawed features.
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